The topic is my lecture is the ways in which ideas of the good figure in moral and political philosophy, and about how that particular use gives ideas of the good a particular shape, different from what they have in the context of a single individual"s deliberation about what to do. Moral Philosophy, as I will understand it, is concerned with principles regulating our conduct toward one another. It is concerned with the content of these principles, and their ground-why we should care about them. Political philosophy, as I will understand it, is concerned with standards for assessing institutions that we participate in and expect others to participate in. God"s commands make sense if these commands were arbitrary? It is surely important that they are the commands of a loving God, and hence grounded in concern for us. So again the justification for the content of moral principles seems to depend on the way they benefit us, and hence on some conception of our good.
grounds, and hence also of content. My immediate response is to accept this assumption, and count myself an individualist in this sense-that is, as someone who believes that in both moral and political philosophy answers to questions of both content and ground must be based on claims about the good of individuals. But one of my themes in this lecture is that my own conception of these matters turns out on reflection to be not as thoroughly individualist as one might at first have supposed. To anticipate, it seems to me on reflection that the conceptions of the good that we appeal to in moral and political philosophy are individualist, but that the ideas of the good we employ outside of this context need not be.
In answering the question of ground, we need to explain how being just, or refraining from treating others in ways that are morally wrong, is at least compatible with having the kind of life that an individual has reason to want for him or herself. To do this, we need to appeal to a conception of what makes for a desirable life that is the one a individual should employ in assessing his or her own life, and making decisions about what to do, insofar as he or she alone is concerned. Similarly, answers to questions of content-questions about, for example, when and why one is required to keep a promise-should also be based on a conception of what individuals have reason to want for themselves.
So it seems that both moral and political philosophy need to appeal, at two points, Consider first the way in which this question arises in Sidgwick"s discussion in The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick distinguishes two rational standpoints. He refers to the first of these as the standpoint of self-interest and to the second as the standpoint of duty, but sometimes also as what is good "from the point of view of the universe." To understand the relation between these standpoints we need to consider two things: the nature of the values to which they, ultimately, appeal, and the nature of the normative conclusions that they yield.
In one sense, these two standpoints seem to appeal to the same ultimate value: This difference is crucial to Sidgwick"s "profoundest problem:" if individuals should, rationally, value their own agreeable consciousness only because these states are impersonally valuable, then the personal point of view would be subsumed within the impersonal, and the problematic of dualism would disappear.
Second, this problem arises for Sidgwick because he believes there are two independent forms of normative thought, the personal and the impersonal, which can give
conflicting directives about what to do. Any account that recognizes two such standpoints leads to the conclusion that a rational individual will be divided within itself when such conflicts occur, and must face the question of how these conflicts are to be resolved. On
Sidgwick"s account this problem is particularly acute because he does not recognize any rational standpoint that could play this role.
I turn now to consider two other problems about the good in moral and political philosophy that, I will argue, have structure that is very similar to the one just described, although they also differ from Sidgwick"s problem in significant ways. I mentioned earlier that Sidgwick referred to his two standpoints as self-interest and duty. So far, I
have generally avoided the latter term because, in order to understand Sidgwick"s Dualism of Practical Reason, I wanted to emphasize that he sees the authority of conclusions about what is good impersonally as rational authority.
But now that we have opened up the possibility of a standpoint from which the authority of these conclusions can be questioned and assessed I will go back to to take the requirements of morality as normally overriding guides to action must have something to say about how being guided in this way fits into the kind of life that a person has reason to want to live. But it does not seem plausible to say that an answer to the question of why we should care about moral requirements must take the form of showing that "being moral" advances one"s self-interest. What is necessary is, rather, to
show that an individual has reasons to be so guided that do not themselves derive from morality. The standpoint from which this question of ground is to be answered is the standpoint from which, I suggested, Sidgwick"s dualism is to be resolved: the broader standpoint from which an individual considers what he or she has most reason to do.
I will now consider two problems concerning the ground of morality, problems that arise concerning the relation between an individual"s personal point of view and a moral point of view. I will argue that these problems are similar, in important ways, to
Sidgwick"s dualism, but also importantly different from it. The first of these is a problem in political philosophy discussed by Karl Marx and John Rawls.
It is generally agreed that justifiable political institutions must allow individuals to practice their various religions as long as this does not involve practices that interfere with the lives of others. As I would put it, a principle that counted institutions that did not do this as entirely just is a principle that it would be reasonable to reject. This rejection would be reasonable because individuals have reason to want to be able to practice their own religion. But "religion" as it is employed in this reasoning, is not a category that is important in the personal thinking of a religious person. It applies to, and treats as of the same importance, a wide variety of different views, many of which are, from the point of view of an adherent of any one of these doctrines, false or even pernicious. Like the two modes of reasoning that Sidgwick described, the modes of reasoning we engage in from these two standpoints-the standpoints of man and of citizen, as Marx There is, of course, tension between these two normative standpoints. If our institutions allow others to live according to their own conceptions of the good, we are likely to find ourselves surrounded by people who live in ways that we disapprove of. We cannot have the kind of public space that we would most like to have, for ourselves and our children. Rawls believes that if our comprehensive view is of the right kind-if it this conflict should be resolved. I want to consider now the different ways in which these standpoints can be understood.
Sidgwick characterizes his two standpoints in the simplest terms. What is good for a person is determined by the quantity of agreeable consciousness in his or her life, counting the same quantity of consciousness equally whenever it occurs. What is good impersonally (the standard of duty) is the greatest amount of agreeable consciousness overall, counting equal quantities of consciousness the same, whatever life they occur within. And there is, for Sidgwick, no third rational standpoint within which the conflicting claims of these two can be adjudicated. I believe that any plausible account of the good for an individual will be pluralistic, including factors of the following three kinds. This is in contrast to my third category, of worthwhile achievements. Developing a talent, or achieving something by exercising, is good for a person in the relevant sense only if that talent or achievement is worth seeking for reasons independent of its contribution to the life of the person in question. This is most obvious in the case of achievements that are worthwhile because of their affects on other people"s lives, such as stopping a famine, or discovering a cure for a debilitating disease. But I would say that it is true as well for intellectual achievements, such as proving a theorem or discovering some fundamental fact about the universe. Such achievements contribute to the quality of a person"s life in a way that getting into the Guinness Book of World Records for eating a large amount of cheese does not. But these things are worth doing because of properties they have on their own, not, as in the case of relationships, because of the difference they make to the lives of those who discover them.
What is more surprising perhaps is that many experiential goods also depend on what is good in this an impersonal sense. There are, or course, experiential goods of which this is not true. Some pleasures, such as bodily pleasures, and freedom from pain are good for a person simply because of their experiential qualities. But any plausible account of experiential goods will have to include forms of pleasure, such as the pleasure or working on a puzzle, or winning a race, that involve taking pleasure in something, such as some activity or achievement. In these cases the pleasure involved is not independent of the idea that its object is in some way good. If, for example, philosophy is a worthless enterprise, or worse, then one should not take pleasure in dong it, but should be embarrassed or ashamed by the time one devotes to it, and to one"s expertise at it. This dependence of the goodness of a state of taking pleasure in something on the goodness of the object of this attitude is not a new point. Both Plato and Aristotle made it long ago.
But it is worth reminding ourselves of.
The more general point that follows is that in the first and third of my three that it is implausible to hold that something is good for an individual only if that thing is
